The International Expansion of the Norwegian Banks
Introduction
Norwegian banks represent a small part of international banking and foreign direct investment in banking. Norway is a small country with a population of only about 4.2 million people; Oslo, the largest city, has less than half a million people. On a world scale, Norwegian banks too are small. In a recent (Banker 1997) We have three reasons for examining the international expansion of Norway's banks. What ties these three reasons together is that the Norwegian case is different in whole or in part from the now well-described US (e.g. Huertas 1990 ), UK (Jones 1990 ) and Japanese cases (Ozawa and Hine 1993) . Wilkins (1990) provides a compact but comprehensive overview for the period before the first World War.
First, we examine the Norwegian banks and their expansion because examining such perhaps peripheral cases is an important research tactic. The first contribution that examining peripheral cases can make is to enhance our understanding of the dominant case; peripheral cases prove (i.e., test) the rule.
The second contribution that examination of peripheral cases may make can be to provide directions for revising theory to widen its coverage.
Second, we examine the Norwegian banks because of the role that domestic regulation played both in encouraging and in limiting their expansion.
Norwegian governments' long-standing discomfort with both inward and outward foreign direct investment in banking had a major effect on the form of the Norwegian banks' international expansion. The literature on the role of host country restrictions in international banking is growing; however the literature on the role of home country restrictions is still small.
Arguably, regulation is a more important factor in foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking than in FDI in manufacturing. As Wilkins (1991) points out, the legal environment influenced the form and the functions of foreign banks engaged in business in America from the earliest days. Even so, the literature on the interaction between regulation and FDI in banking is limited. Typically, authors have looked at regulation as a barrier to the entry of foreign banks (Tschoegl 1981 (Tschoegl , 1985 (Tschoegl and 1988 or as a factor in inducing overseas investment (Poulsen 1986) . In a recent article ter Wengel (1995) tested the utility of various trade theories in explaining international banking. His main finding was that none of the trade theories was well-supported but that economies of scale were important; he also found that regulation acted as both a goad to and a constraint on international expansion.
For the Norwegian banks too, regulations acted both to goad and to constrain the banks' internationalization. Domestic legislation also influenced when, how and where the banks went abroad.
Lastly, we examine the Norwegian banks because they provide evidence for another theme that has emerged in the literature on foreign direct investment --strategic interaction between firms as a factor in foreign direct investment. The argument dates back at least to Knickerbocker (1973) , Flowers (1976) and Graham (1978) and takes into account the roles of rivalry between and collusion among firms as factors in the FDI decision. The theoretical work in this area uses a game-theoretic perspective, modeling the interaction between firms as an open-ended, repeated game. Graham (1990) provides a model for an exchange of threat scenario. Veugelers (1995) offers a model that enables one to analyze when strategic considerations may dominate and possibly counteract the effect of location and firm-specific motivations for FDI. Recent empirical work includes Yu and Ito (1988) , Terpstra and Yu (1989) , Ito and Rose (1994) and Hennart and Park (1994) . Choi et al., (1986 Choi et al., ( & 1996 incorporate variables designed to measure strategic interactions in their examination of the factors influencing whether banks from one financial center establish operations in another center. Engwall and Wallenstål (1988) address the issue in their examination of the internationalization of Swedish banks as do Laakso (1984) and Hellman's (1994) examinations of the internationalization of Finnish banks.
We divide the paper below into two substantive sections. The first of these two sections is an historical overview of the evolution of Norway's banking sector, and especially of the sector's international evolution. The section focuses on the when of the banks' international expansion. A major issue throughout is the role of the home country regulatory environment in the banks' internationalization.
The second of the two sections examines the (micro) part of the why of the banks' international expansion. In particular we detail where the banks went in following their customers' business and in seeking business, and the role of strategic considerations.
Norwegian banking history

The period before W.W. II: domestic banking
The three Norwegian commercial banks that make up the bulk of our story are Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK; est. 1848), Bergens Privatbank (est. 1855) and Den norske Creditbank (DnC; est. 1857). CBK, established in Oslo where it still has its headquarters, was Norway's first commercial bank. Savings banks had existed since 1822 but these were community welfare organizations whereas merchants needed a bank to discount bills (Nordvik 1994) . CBK was a response to the growing demand from the merchant community for short-term financing but did little until spurred by the founding of DnC (Nordvik 1994) .
CBK and DnC (also based in Oslo) catered to customers on the eastern side of the country. Bergens Privatbank, based in Bergen, served the west coast.
Norway's banks were only a secondary factor in the building up of Norwegian society, industry and commerce during this period of political union between Norway and Sweden. Knutsen (1991) argues that the structural characteristics of the Norwegian economy were such that Norway did not need a strong commercial banking sector. Savings banks, government credit and private arrangements sufficed.
After Norway became independent in 1905, the banking system continued to grow but the banks themselves remained small and local. Other than the Den Norske Handelsbank (Trade Bank of Norway) none developed branches outside the locality of their incorporation. Furthermore, all concentrated on short-term lending (Lange 1994a and Knutsen 1994) .
Domestic legislation appears to have caused both the decentralization and the focus on short-term lending. The Storting (Parliament) made branching difficult in response to local concerns that branch banks would drain funds from local towns (Knutsen 1991) . Until just before World War I, domestic laws forbade or discouraged private bond issues (Knutsen 1991) . Unable to borrow long, the banks were probably reluctant to lend long. As a result, Norway relied on foreign sources for long-term funds. Handelsbank, the largest bank in the country. The Centralbanken for Norge, a major Norwegian participant in the international loan clubs, also failed (Johansen 1991) . 1 The crisis led to the first legislation providing for public supervision of the banking system (Knutsen 1994 On the international scene, US companies were expanding at a rapid pace, and American banks began to establish subsidiaries and branches abroad.
European banks followed suit, though at a slower pace. The emergence of the Eurodollar market made it increasingly easy to borrow abroad. At the same time the Norwegian reserve requirements made it difficult for the Norwegian commercial banks to borrow abroad (Bjørland 1985) . After 1965, the ratio of loans in foreign exchange to total loans steadily declined at the Norwegian banks, and the banks began a collective lobbying effort to have the government reconsider the laws and regulations.
Establishing a foothold in the European Economic Community was also important to all the major Nordic banks as none of the Nordic countries were members of the EEC. Many business-people feared that European economic cooperation would result in a closed capital market. After 1972, when Norway voted to reject membership, it became even more important to have a foothold behind the "wall" that many feared the EEC would build.
The banks' first destination was Paris because many felt that Paris might well become Europe's financial center. When it became clear that London, rather than Paris, was becoming the financial hub of Europe, the Nordic banks established a major presence there. In time the United Kingdom became "the country in which Norwegian banks engage in universal banking to the largest extent" (DnC 1982).
1970 to 1985: Expansion
In 1971, the Federal Reserve released the US dollar from its previous connection with the price of gold, which led to instant turbulence in the international capital markets, and great shifts in exchange rates. The new exchange rate regime was a major catalyst for the emergence of international banking if for no other reason than its impetus to the creation of foreign exchange trading.
The rise in oil prices after 1974 provided a second impetus to the international expansion of the Norwegian banks. One reason was that the banks wanted to gain access to the OPEC members surplus funds (Petersen 1982) . More
importantly, the Norwegian banks ended up going abroad in order to defend their position with their domestic clients.
As oil companies found more and more oil in the North Sea and Norway's wealth increased, foreign banks became increasingly aggressive in approaching Norwegian firms. The foreign banks sought to serve the firms' domestic business as well as their foreign business. Ongena and Smith's (1997) Restrictions in the other Nordic countries on entry by foreign banks also skewed the international expansion of the Norwegian banks. Denmark (until 1971) , Finland (1979 and and Sweden (1986) pursued exclusionary policies like those of Norway. Barred from the nearest, arguably most logical markets to enter, the Nordic banks had to go farther afield.
In 1977, the Labor government enacted legislation that allowed the government to appoint a majority on the banks' representative councils which elect the bank boards. In 1982, shareholders regained the right to elect a majority on the councils and hence regained effective control. The period of de facto government control was not one of extensive international expansion; geographic expansion picked up in 1982 and after (Table 1) . However we cannot infer much about the government's influence from this.
In 1978 and 1980, the government revised the bank law and Norges Bank relaxed its regulations further. At the end of 1980, the Norwegian commercial banks reported that they had NOK 19.3 billion in assets in overseas banks (Norwegian Commercial Banks 1981) . This amounted to about 21% of the banks' total assets in Norway. The geographical breakdown was: 53% in Luxembourg; 31% in London; 9% in Switzerland; and 7% in the USA, France and the Netherlands. In terms of the parent bank ownership of the foreign assets, the breakdown was: 45% DnC; 29% BB; 15% CBK; 14% Forretningsbanken; 9.5% Bøndernes; and 6% Fellesbanken.
Geographically, in terms of the weight of their expansion, the Norwegian banks expanded first to Europe, then to America and lastly to Asia (Table 2) .
From 1975 to 1990, Europe always accounted for the bulk of the banks' activities.
1985-1990: Deregulation
The most important change in the Norwegian banking laws occurred in 1984 when the government substantially deregulated banking. The government removed the prohibition against Norwegian banks establishing branches abroad.
Within four years Norwegian banks had thirteen foreign branches. However a number of these, for instance in London and New York, complemented or replaced existing operations.
Norway also finally permitted foreign banks to establish de novo subsidiaries (but not branches) in Norway. Seven foreign banks entered immediately in 1985;
the number peaked at nine before falling back to the current five (Tschoegl 1996) .
At least one study (Berg et al., 1992) Bank, CBK and Fokus.
1990 and beyond: failure and reorganization
The banking crisis in Norway was part of a worldwide phenomenon of financial system problems associated with deflation of real estate values (Bartholomew 1994; Ball 1994) . Koskenkylä (1994) reports that the crisis in
Norway peaked a year or so before that in the other Nordic countries.
Furthermore, loan losses were more severe in Norway than in Denmark and
Finland but less severe than in Sweden. One reason the crisis started earlier in
Norway was the fall in oil prices when the price for Brent (North Sea) crude oil fell from its peak of over US$35/barrel in 1982 to US$9/barrel at the low point in 1986. Bartholomew (1994) and others suggest that lax supervision and loose monetary and fiscal policies also played a role in the severity of the problems in Norway.
On April 17, 1990, DnC and Bergen Bank, merged under the name Den norske Bank (DnB). A large restructuring followed in both the bank's domestic and international operations (Table 3) .
Loan losses continued to mount. Norway's three largest commercial banks, 
Why the Norwegian banks went abroad
Den norske Creditbank (DnC), Bergen Bank (BB), and Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK) have been responsible for most of the international expansion by Norwegian banks (Table 2 ). In 1990, DnB (DnC+BB) accounted for 49% of Norwegian banks' foreign assets; CBK accounted for 39%. Sparebanken NOR accounted for 12%.
Then DnC and BB (now DnB) and CBK are the most important banks for Norwegian corporations. For most of the 1970 to 1990 period, the three ranked 1, 3 and 2 in terms of total assets. As Table 4 shows, these banks accounted for about three-quarters of all the bank relationships reported by the banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. It is not surprising then that the Norwegian banks' main motivation for going abroad was to follow their principal Norwegian industrial customers, especially in shipping and later oil (Flatraaker and Husevåg 1991) .
In this, the Norwegian banks behaved like their colleagues in the other Nordic countries. For Danish, Finnish and Swedish banks, Vastrup (1983) , Laakso (1984) and Engwall and Wallenstål (1988) too argue that the primary motive for going abroad was to follow their customers. With respect to the Finnish banks, Hellman 1994) contests the point. Hellman suggests that the Finnish banks went to international financial centers seeking business rather than following their customers. However neither motive precludes the other.
The Norwegian banks did more than follow their customers. They also sought new business and took into account the behavior of their domestic competitors.
Business following
As Kindleberger (1983) points out, banks have been following their customers' business abroad throughout European history. In following the business, the foreign banks may establish in a foreign location before or after their clients. Heinkel and Levi (1992) report that the establishment by foreign banks of branches in a location is highly correlated with exports to the foreign location from the banks' home countries. To the degree that exports precede FDI, the foreign banks may precede some clients while following others.
In reviewing its own operations, DnC (1982) reported that its moves abroad took place in three phases. First, DnC guaranteed loans in the foreign location for the bank's Norwegian customers. Second, DnC itself borrowed and lent to its customers in foreign exchange. The third and last step was to establish a joint venture or subsidiary when the volume of business warranted an organizational presence in the market.
Because the banks' customers operated in different sectors that had their own geographical imperatives, the banks ended up opening offices on every continent. The four most important corporate sectors for the banks were (in temporal order) lumber (including paper and pulp), shipping, oil, and fisheries.
The needs of Norway's tourists and retirees represented a fifth sector. 
Business seeking
As the banks began expanding abroad, a new element entered the discussion. Leading bankers began to assert that the banks should no longer tie their international expansion exclusively to that of their Norwegian clients. In 1969, the then CEO of DnC, Johan Melander, said in a speech, "I will claim that in principle it must be a natural thing that one does banking --the same way as any other type of business --wherever it is profitable, whether it is in Europe, the USA, Africa or Asia" (Melander 1978) . Thus the Norwegian banks began to seek access to markets that appeared to offer greater growth potential than the domestic market.
For instance, in Asia, DnC opened representative offices in Beijing and
Osaka to build its presence in these emerging financial markets. The bank stated that it had no intention of establishing subsidiaries in these markets as the amount of business done by Norwegian companies in the area was fairly small. customers. The offices were to inform about the services the bank offered, as well as receive and guide customers who came to visit." The parent bank could use the experience of the representative office to discover whether the market was big enough to warrant establishing a subsidiary. (Melander 1978 ) that "the representative offices are, as one might notice, placed in LatinAmerica, the Middle East, and the South-East area of Asia, including
Japan. This has been done because one finds that it is particularly in these areas that Norwegian businesses should have the greatest potential for growth, of course in addition to the main areas of Western Europe and North America. It is the task of DnC to serve its customers while obtaining as good of an understanding as possible of these parts of the world."
The Norwegian banks appear to have tried many experiments only to curtail most. We do not know how typical of international banks their strategy and experience was. Tschoegl's (1982) study of foreign banks in California and Japan suggests that exit from markets is rare. However, Tschoegl's data covers the 1970s, a period when international banking activity was growing rapidly in both countries. The behavior of the Norwegian banks suggests that the stability that
Tschoegl found is probably due to the attractiveness of the host markets.
Interestingly, the attractiveness did not extend to the Norwegian banks. All the Norwegian banks that entered either California or Tokyo established no more than representative offices and left within a few years.
After DnC and Bergen bank merged in 1990, they closed many offices abroad (Table 3) When the government took over CBK, it reduced the international division drastically. Now CBK maintains branches only in London, Singapore, New York and Seattle. It has also retained its wholly owned-subsidiary in Luxembourg.
CBK's 1994 annual report states, "The goal of the bank's activities abroad is to supplement the domestic activities, so that CBK's competitiveness towards its customers which operate abroad can be maintained."
Strategic behavior
We can describe at least three types of strategic behavior: oligopolistic reaction (Knickerbocker 1973 and Flowers 1976) , exchange of threat (Graham 1978 ) and mutual avoidance. With oligopolistic reaction, firms from the same country see each other as rivals and mimic each other's investment behavior to prevent the other from gaining a decisive edge. Engwall and Wallenstål (1988) and Hellman (1994) argue that the Swedish and Finnish banks exhibited just such behavior in their international expansion. The empirical problem is distinguishing oligopolistic reaction from parallel responses to similar situations.
The anecdotal evidence for oligopolistic reaction exists, but one can usually make the case that each firm in question would have invested in a particular market even if their competitors had not. 9 Ball and Tschoegl (1982) , in one of the few statistical examinations of the idea in banking, did find that the number of a bank's competitors in Japan or California increased the probability that the bank would itself be in Japan or California, even after they had accounted for other indicators of market attractiveness. Even so, one could still argue that the oligopolistic reaction variable was simply picking up factors missed by the relatively crude control variables. alliances in a pattern that Fenema (1982) describes as "enemies of one's enemies'
friends." When the prohibitions on intra-Nordic FDI in banking fell, the alliances dissolved (Jacobsen and Tschoegl 1997) .
Choi et al., (1986 & 1996) 
Conclusion
Regulation played a major role in the expansion of the Norwegian banks.
The desire to continue to serve their customers' international needs, especially in the face of competition from foreign banks, spurred the Norwegian banks to go abroad to avoid the constricting effect of domestic regulations. Regulations limited the Norwegian banks in terms of both the forms of their international expansion, and occasionally the locations to which they could go. Lastly, by blocking all foreign banks from the domestic markets, regulation may have facilitated cooperation between the Nordic banks.
The Norwegian banks went abroad in the post-war era to serve their customers, particularly in the lumber and pulp, shipping, oil, and fishing industries. In time the banks came to participate in the international wholesale markets, especially in the area of foreign exchange. Retail banking, except for some minor ventures for retirees in Spain, was not a factor. The pattern of the internationalization of the Norwegian banks over time, geography, and form was like that of most of the other major Nordic banks.
In going abroad, it is clear that all the banks engaged in many experiments.
Not only did the Norwegian banks experiment with the form of expansion (joint or solo) but also with location. All the Norwegian banks exhibit numerous instances of short-lived ventures, especially representative offices opened and closed within a few years or even less than a year. This is consistent with Kogut's (1983) view of foreign direct investment as a process of the sequential exercise of options to invest. Frequently the Norwegian banks withdrew, i.e., they let the option expire unused.
Clearly, the Norwegian banking industry has undergone some major changes in the last three decades. The bank crisis of 1991 forced the banks to curtail their international activities and to trim back the expansion of the 1970s and early 1980s. With the failure and reorganization behind them, the banks are carefully beginning to rebuild their presence abroad. They are concentrating on well-known markets with a solid, existing customer base of Norwegian companies doing business in the area.
One issue for future research that the case of the Norwegian banks raises is that of one element of corporate culture --temperament. By analogy to human temperament what we mean is a tendency to caution or to adventure. DnC, BB and CBK all faced objectively similar situations after World War II. All three were the major banks for corporate customers and in 1979, DnC and CBK at least had the same number of relationships with quoted companies. Still DnC and BB followed a more aggressive policy on international expansion than did CBK.
CBK was even, at least at first, willing to loose a customer to its competitors rather than go abroad to a far away, exotic place such as Brazil. DnC and BB on the one hand and CBK on the other not only differed in their willingness to go abroad, but also in their willingness to ally with other Nordic banks to do so.
The question then is, can we meaningfully speak of a firm's temperament?
5 Interview with Mr. Tor Hestvik, District Manager for DnB, Haugesund, on January 12, 1995. 6 The total market value of the company has increased from US$500 million to US$2 billion in the last ten years. The company has been listed on NYSE since 1992.
7 Totaling NOK 300 million by 1995. Recently DnB announced that it intends to sell its interests in the company, despite the positive development of the Brazilian cellulose industry over the last few years. Reportedly DnB believes that the investment is not part of its primary competencies (Strømen 1995). 
